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DIRECTORATE OF  
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# Intelligence Memorandum

ORIENTATION OF THE NEW GREEK GOVERNMENT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
25 April 1967

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Orientation of the New Greek Government

1. Preliminary analysis of the new Greek Government indicates that the nation's new rulers have a strong moralistic motivation and are probably considerably to the right of the standard brand of Greek conservative.

2. From their public and private statements it is evident that the coup leaders aim at more than merely preventing a Communist take-over. Their emphasis on social justice, social welfare, a national mission, order, and unity may be merely rhetoric and designed for broad appeal, but their equation of order and internal security with justice and their stress on the obligation of the press to respond to the national mission appear to go beyond what was necessary for this purpose. In their demands on King Constantine to go along with their "revolution" or leave Greece, and in their disdain for civilian politicians of all stripes, they show their distrust for even the old, established conservative forces.

3. There are hints that the coup leaders envision a more nationalistic foreign policy, especially in their insistence that Greece, while supporting NATO, intends to demand its rights as an equal member of the alliance. Although they have solicited support and understanding from the US, they have revealed an underlying suspicion that US support will

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generally favor the monarchy rather than their new regime. The new government's Cyprus policy appears to be what any Greek government must have, an expressed aim of enosis.

4. The new government's stated economic policies stress a just distribution of national income, a hastening of economic development, and an extension of social welfare programs. Here, too, there is some animus against the traditional conservatives--the "economic oligarchy."

5. The initial policy statements, in their various parts, seem to be the work of different drafters trying to meet different needs, but there is an underlying flavor of idealistic, ideological dedication. [REDACTED]

1.5(c)(c)  
3.4(b)(1)(6)

[REDACTED] the outlook of key members of the military conspiracy, the origin of which goes back to late 1962 or early 1963. The colonels formed a group of their own at that time because the senior rightist officers who made up the old, ultraright IDEA (Sacred Bond of Greek Officers) seemed to them to be "self-seekers." Even the King was too bland for the colonels. Although he had been made aware of their plans earlier, by mid-1966 the King was not being informed because the colonels felt he was getting bad advice from his immediate entourage. The new government's policy statements indicate that the colonels--many of whom come from families who are not part of the Greek "establishment"--believe their day has come. They have not made a coup merely to turn the government over to the King's "bankers," and if politicians eventually are permitted to participate, these will be of a new, re-educated breed.

6. How much of this kind of forthright authoritarian reform will be possible, given Greek political traditions, remains to be seen. The coup leaders themselves may already be concerned by the problems of implementation, since one of them at least has indicated that US assistance would be welcome.